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ABSTRACT: War has become a form of  secular religion for many 
Americans in the modern era. Much of  our deployment of  military 
power during the last 50 years has rested on a set of  absolute beliefs 
about the overall utility of  war. In the process, policymakers and  
citizens alike maintain an enduring faith that the United States, via its 
military forces, has the power to transform societies abroad.
Religious fundamentalism. For at least the last decade and a half, countless Americans have relied on this one phrase to help them interpret violence across the globe and most certainly in the 
Middle East. More often than not, the words “religious” and “Islamic” 
become easily conflated, convenient aphorisms explaining what drives 
contemporary conflict. Many Westerners tend to view Islamic funda-
mentalism as a medieval, if  not primitive, outlook; its adherents as not 
simply lagging in social and cultural development but turning their backs 
on the modern world. In the process, the lines between identity groups 
blur. Whether Taliban, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or the Islamic State, reli-
gious zealots—militants who have forsaken not only modernity but also 
Western values and the civilized world—are “savages” who kill apostates, 
Muslim and Christian alike, to purify the world.1
If subversive Islamic fundamentalists selectively interpret the sacred 
text of the Qurʾān to justify violence, is it possible Americans are equally 
discriminatory when defending their own, seemingly moral, obligations 
for waging war?2 In truth, much of America’s deployment of military 
power during the last 50 years, even back to the early twentieth century, 
rested on a set of absolute beliefs, convictions amounting to a sort of 
secular fundamentalism. Policymakers and citizens alike possess an 
enduring faith that the United States, via its military forces, has the 
power to transform societies abroad.
While less religious in its call to arms than militant Islamic 
extremism, the devotion to reforming the world order in the American 
image still has strong theological underpinnings. Senator Albert J. 
Beveridge illustratively exclaimed God had “marked the American 
people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the regeneration of 
1     Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Islamic Fundamentalism, the Permanent Threat,” Jerusalem Post, 
July 20, 2014; and Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” Atlantic, March 2015. Of  note, President 
Barack Obama has attempted to disassociate “extremism” from “religious fundamentalism.” 
See Kathleen Hennessey and Christi Parson, “At Summit on Extremism, Obama Defends His 
Semantic Choices regarding Islam,” Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2015.
2     Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of  Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modern Library, 
2003), 138.
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the world” in the late 1890s.3 Over a century later, Chris S. Kyle, the 
American Sniper, deployed to the Middle East to fight against “fanatics” 
who “hated us because we weren’t Muslim.” According to one account, 
Kyle, like many soldiers, was “deeply religious and saw the Iraq War 
through that prism.”4
Such devotionals suggest many Americans feel war is not a neces-
sary evil; it is simply necessary. This obligation to wage war rests on 
the conviction that nearly all American interventions abroad are both 
politically and morally justifiable. Even when questions are raised about 
legitimacy, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Americans’ faith in the 
transformative capacities of US military power is hardly dented. Thus, 
at the close of 2015, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham could 
argue proper military strategy would enable the United States not only to 
destroy the Islamic State quickly but also to do so while “creating condi-
tions that can prevent it, or a threat like it, from ever re-emerging.”5 
These aspirations rested on little evidence that the United States could 
achieve such far-reaching goals in a region stubbornly resistant to 
American influence.
Moreover, dogmatic faith in what war can deliver limits serious 
debate about the utility of force in achieving foreign policy objectives. 
Since the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, most policy 
deliberations centered upon the mechanics of military strategy— 
troop strengths, stay-behind forces, and expansion of combat beyond 
certain countries’ borders. Left unexamined is the potentially flawed 
supposition that war is in fact furthering US policy goals. Hence, 
Andrew J.  Bacevich observes that even in an era of “persistent 
conflict,” few senior officials, even those in the Pentagon, can explain 
why war has become “inescapable.”6 With little reflection, war has 
become a reflexive, if not permanent, part of American conduct overseas.
Faithful Works
The ideological underpinnings of this martial faith have a long 
history in the United States. Since at least the World War I era, Americans 
have fashioned war as a necessary struggle between democratic good 
and totalitarian evil. No doubt Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric matched his 
religious principles when he asked Congress for a declaration of war 
against Germany and its allies in April 1917. Though Wilson lamented 
leading a “great peaceful people into war,” the president nonetheless felt 
obliged to “fight for the things which we have always carried nearest 
our hearts—for democracy” and for rights shared “by such a concert of 
free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the 
world itself at last free.”7
3     Beveridge quoted in John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 25.
4     Chris Kyle, American Sniper: The Autobiography of  the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History, 
with Scott McEwen and Jim DeFelice (New York: William Morrow, 2013), 86; and Nicholas 
Schmidle, “In The Crosshairs,” New Yorker, June 3, 2013.
5     John McCain and Lindsey Graham, “How to Defeat ISIS Now—Not ‘Ultimately,’ ” Wall Street 
Journal, December 7, 2015.
6     Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 234.
7     Woodrow Wilson, “War Message” (address, 65th Congress, Washington, DC, April 2, 1917), 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson’s_War_Message_to_Congress.
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Wilson’s postulation of American democracy as the apogee of 
modern political development could be shared even by those citizens 
unenthusiastic about the American role in creating a liberal world 
order. When compared to Russian Bolshevism or German militarism, 
American-conceived liberalism, according to Wilson, was “the only 
thing that can save civilization from chaos.”8
This sense of exceptionalism, hardly a cynical faith, became reified 
after the Allied victory in World War II. Americans believed they had 
fought for freedom and won, in part, because they were on the right side 
of history. The awareness of Japanese atrocities in China and German 
genocidal policies in Europe bolstered this sense of American moralism. 
Thus, historian Stephen E. Ambrose could look back admiringly and 
argue Americans won because of “moral superiority” and an open 
national system. “Democracy,” Ambrose trumpeted, “proved better able 
to produce young men who could be made into superb soldiers than 
Nazi Germany.”9
Ambrose’s conception of democratic citizen-soldiers success-
fully fighting a global war against totalitarianism may have reinforced 
congenial notions of the “greatest generation,” but World War II remained 
highly atypical. In fact, most of America’s interventions in the twentieth 
century were undeclared executive actions. In Haiti, Nicaragua, the 
Philippines, and Korea, Americans went to and remained at war for 
decades with little Congressional debate or oversight. In the process, US 
soldiers, sailors, and marines found themselves more frequently serving 
across the globe in police functions to stabilize hot spots and to facili-
tate enduring American access and influence abroad. This involvement 
was not an American version of imperialism, policy leaders contended, 
but rather a “Pax Americana” in which a strong, righteous nation was 
fulfilling its moral obligation to stabilize and secure the international 
system.
Though this confidence in American power has strong roots, we 
would be misguided to assume all policymakers and citizens embrace a 
faith-based approach to waging war. A national “way of war” paradigm 
is problematic given the ever-changing factors influencing both the 
causes and conduct of war. And yet, cultural constraints often do define 
how we think about conflict. As Patrick Porter convincingly asserts, 
Western exceptionalism has long viewed non-Western cultures as “natu-
rally, irrationally violent.” Thus, the idea that “the enemy is singularly 
obsessed with strength and weakness, impressed only by dash and brutal 
treatment” emerged.10
In the process, Americans easily fashioned any call to arms as a 
crusade for survival and national identity. In his state of the union 
address in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, President 
George W. Bush expressed hope that “all nations will heed our call, and 
8     Wilson quoted in Susan A. Brewer, Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the 
Philippines to Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 79.
9     Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of  Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy 
to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 224.
10     Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 40. On questioning the “way of  war” thesis, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, 
Reconsidering the American Way of  War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
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eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our 
own.” His remarks were pure Wilsonian in tone and language. “History 
has called America and our allies to action,” Bush exclaimed, “and it 
is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom’s fight.”11 
Throughout that summer the president proclaimed our “nation is the 
greatest force for good in history.”12
A decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq—not to mention US drone 
strikes across the Middle East—did little to challenge such faith-based 
assumptions. In late 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter insisted 
the United States was going to “beat” the Islamic State because “we 
are . . . the noble and they are the evil. And we are the many and they 
are the few. And fundamentally we’re the strong.”13 Could American 
strength truly emanate from our nobility and goodness? It seems doubt-
ful the Islamic State sees the United States as a force for global good. 
In fact, from a different vantage point, crusading American rhetoric 
employed during the Global War on Terror could be interpreted as its 
own form of jihad.14
The duty to preserve, if not expand, American influence abroad 
has come at a cost. Since the end of World War II, US servicemen and 
women have served in what increasingly resembles an expeditionary 
force, akin to those of the British Empire in the late-nineteenth century. 
In fact, not long after 9/11, interventionist Max Boot advocated for 
a more imperial role. To Boot, the problem had “not been excessive 
American assertiveness but rather insufficient assertiveness.” In short, 
the United States was not acting “as a great power should.”15 Such argu-
ments, however, dismissed the historical record suggesting much of the 
Cold War era could be framed by the anticolonial struggle in the Third 
World. Nor did advocates of an American empire acknowledge, as did 
Douglas Porch recently, that throughout much of the past two centuries 
“soldiers on the colonial fringe deployed brutal tactics increasingly at 
odds with legal restraints.”16
This blurring of lines between the legitimate and extralegal use of 
force stems, in part, from how our faith shapes interpretations of the 
enemy. A crusading spirit drives Americans to believe their enemies, 
however defined, have aspirations of, and the capacity to achieve, global 
dominance. In short, all threats are existential. In the aftermath of the 
Paris attacks of 2015, Thomas Donnelly argued in the Weekly Standard 
that “Europe, in particular, faces what might well be an existential 
threat; a way of life does seem to hang in the balance.” The reason for 
Europe’s “collapse?” Because, Donnelly maintained, “the United States 
has stepped back from playing its role as the defender of the West.” 
11     George W. Bush, “State of  the Union Address” (speech, US Capitol, Washington, DC, 
January 29, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129 
-11.html.
12     George W. Bush, Public Papers of  the Presidents of  the United States George W. Bush, 2002, bk. 2 
(Washington, DC: Office of  the Federal Register, March 2006), 1517.
13     “Remarks by Secretary [Ashton] Carter at Fort Wainwright, Alaska,” US Department of  
Defense, October 31, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View 
/Article/626820/remarks-by-secretary-carter-at-a-troop-event-at-fort-wainwright-alaska.
14     Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 4.
15     Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” Weekly Standard, October 15, 2001.
16     Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of  the New Way of  War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29.
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Americans had lost their will and thus their way. Not so for the Islamic 
State. As Donnelly claimed, “This is a contest between the faithful—
them—and the increasingly faithless—us.”17
Donnelly bewailed the loss of faith in a war against evil as nothing 
new. During the Cold War, for instance, nearly all politicians could 
lash out at opponents for not prosecuting the war against communism 
with more vigor. Truman’s supposed “loss of China” carried political 
weight for Republicans as few Americans wished to consider the 
possibility that US influence mattered little in the Chinese civil 
war between Mao Zedong’s communists and the Kuomintang-led 
government. In an ironic twist, the words of Wisconsin Senator Joseph 
McCarthy pontificated fellow Americans should not only build and 
maintain free nations abroad, but also to defend the one at home. H. W. 
Brands could thus wryly dub the height of McCarthy-era America as the 
“national insecurity state.”18
Invested Talents
These Cold War and contemporary assumptions about the enemy 
undergirded Americans’ faith in war, both home and abroad. But so 
too, however, has been our faith in technology to defeat evil around 
the globe. Advanced weaponry promised victories at low cost (at least 
in American lives) and served as valuable symbols “of prestige, of 
technological prowess, [and] of national power and identity.” Yet as 
the twentieth century wore on, popular resistance movements proved 
frustratingly resistant to sophisticated military hardware. As Tami Davis 
Biddle notes, even the “overall political influence that was achieved 
by the possession of a vast nuclear arsenal is difficult to measure.”19 
Still, US policymakers believed throughout much of the Cold War that 
technological superiority enhanced national prestige and thus 
confirmed the strength (and righteousness) of a liberal democratic 
system over communism.
Technology also eased American incursions into postcolonial 
markets, a seeming necessity in the zero-sum game against Cold War 
communism. For the consumer-based culture of the 1950s, interven-
tions abroad not only served to demonstrate resolve against the Red 
Scare of encroaching communism, but also ensured global economic 
access by shouldering American prosperity at home. American leaders 
still employed Wilsonian rhetoric when depicting their war aims: 
democracy and freedom remained at the center of faith-based calls for 
war. Moreover, the ever-growing market economy depended upon the 
expansion of US power overseas, and waging faith-based wars bridged 
the gap between domestic and foreign policies.20
17     Thomas Donnelly, “An Existential Threat,” Weekly Standard, November 19, 2015.
18     H. W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 31.
19     Tami Davis Biddle, “Shield and Sword: U.S. Strategic Forces and Doctrine since 1945,” in 
The Long War: A New History of  U.S. National Security Policy since World War II, ed. Andrew J. Bacevich 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 140; and Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military 
Power and the Fate of  Continents, 1450–2000 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 285.
20     As early as 1959, William Appleman Williams had established the quest for overseas 
markets had driven American interventions around the world long before the Cold War in The Tragedy 
of  American Diplomacy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959, 1972), 10.
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Sustaining economic growth at home meant building a stable 
international system that allowed American access. To best achieve this 
vision, policymakers in the Kennedy era placed their faith in modern-
ization theory. According to advocates like Walt Whitman Rostow, the 
United States would guide developing nations along a linear path to 
liberal capitalism. As Rostow explained, US mentorship would lead to 
“a new post-colonial relationship,” forming “a new partnership among 
free men—rich and poor alike.” Of course, such ambitions rested on the 
tenuous assumption that all “free men” embraced the American defini-
tion of modernity. Rostow and his supporters gave little heed to foreign 
political leaders, especially those in the Third World, who considered 
the source of their troubles not insufficient but rather excessive modern-
ization. “Traditional” societies, modernizers argued, simply needed to 
overcome “pre-Newtonian science” and “long-run fatalism.”21
If modernization theorists erred in reducing the complexities of 
local histories and habitudes, so too did their successors in promoting 
nation-building abroad. Neoconservatives and liberal interventionists 
alike fashioned nation-building for their own needs to counter terrorism, 
to spread democracy, and to rebuild economies in war-torn countries. 
Underlying all of these aims was the faith Americans could create lasting 
democracies abroad. Even in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion (2003) 
and the erratic performance of US nation-building efforts, critics of the 
Bush administration leveled their charges on processes rather than objec-
tives. Thus, one analysis of the Iraq reconstruction endeavor concluded 
successful “nation-building requires unity of effort across multiple 
agencies” and the creation of a “full integrated political-military plan.”22 
Whether such bureaucratic efficiencies would inspire a postconflict or 
failing state’s transformation into a lasting democracy was left unstated.
A crucial assumption laced within the promises of both moderniza-
tion theory and the assurances of nation-builders is foreign people will 
always see Americans as liberators, never as invaders or occupiers. As 
Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton note, the “need to protect American 
freedom by the direct exertion of power has always coexisted uneasily 
with the American faith that other peoples if offered the chance will vol-
untarily adopt political systems and values consistent with those of the 
United States.”23 Yet historical case studies ranging from the Philippines 
and Indochina to Somalia and Afghanistan suggest this faith is far too 
often misplaced. Of course, US forces have served admirably and been 
welcomed as part of numerous peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. 
Military interventions in support of nation-building efforts, however, 
regularly produced local fighters who judged Americans as doing little 
more than invading their own social and political spaces.
No US intervention during the Cold War better illustrated this 
point than the failed nation-building effort in South Vietnam. The 
Johnson administration never unlocked the mystery of simultaneously 
fighting a war and building a noncommunist nation. Though President 
21     Rostow quoted in Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 
“Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of  North Carolina Press, 2000), 16, 45.
22     James Dobbins et al., After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2008), 135–36.
23     Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, The Dominion of  War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 
1500–2000 (New York: Viking, 2005), 424.
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Johnson spoke in April 1965 of building schools, power plants, and 
farm programs, American outsiders could never convince the majority 
of the South Vietnamese population that their future best lay with the 
Saigon government.24 Ultimately, failure in Vietnam may have soured 
Americans on war, but only briefly. The decade following the fall of 
Saigon saw enough fighting for a recently retired US Army general to 
dub it an “era of violent peace.”25 Post-Vietnam critics might question 
American exceptionalism, yet war’s exceptionalism seemed well intact.
Even if Americans were wary of foreign interventions after Vietnam, 
they still hardly denounced the frequent military operations taking US 
armed forces around the globe in the post-Cold War era. Once more, 
faith in American power reinforced overseas deployments. As Roland 
Paris notes of the period, “Peacebuilding missions in the 1990s were 
guided by a generally unstated but widely accepted theory of conflict 
management: the notion that promoting ‘liberalization’ in countries 
that had recently experienced civil war would help create the conditions 
for a stable and lasting peace.”26 Yet from Africa to the Middle East 
to Eastern Europe lasting peace never seemed to quite take hold. Was 
it possible American influence and leadership could only achieve so 
much, even in an era when European allies were labeling the United 
States a “hyperpower?”
Rightful Divisions
Such questions remained largely unanswered as American interven-
tionists placed their faith in yet another application of military strategy: 
counterinsurgency. Written in 2006 as the war in Iraq was unraveling, 
the new counterinsurgency field manual conceded insurgencies were 
protracted affairs; thus, soldiers and their commanders had to manage 
their expectations. Yet the doctrine also promoted ambitious aims: 
military forces would help regain the population’s “active and continued 
support”; local security forces would assist in securing the population 
and separating them from the insurgents; and clear-hold-build operations 
would convince the populace to support the host-nation government. 
The doctrine’s writers hoped commanders could translate the lessons 
of the manual into practice and, with wise execution of their plans, 
“adapt and win.”27
This new doctrine fostered unrealistic expectations outside the mili-
tary ranks about the possibilities of counterinsurgency. In the cities of 
Iraq and provinces of Afghanistan, however, the allegedly progressive, 
humanist approach retained a violent edge tending to undercut the more 
long-term goals of social and political stability. According to one survey, 
a massive increase in bombing to support military operations as part of 
24     Lyndon B. Johnson, “Peace without Conquest” (speech, Johns Hopkins University, 
Baltimore, MD, April 7, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches 
.hom/650407.asp.
25     Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 1975–1986: An Era of  Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio, 
1988).
26     Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 5.
27     Headquarters, US Department of  the Army (HQDA), Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 
3-24 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006), 2-1, 5-20, A-1. Of  note, page 1-11 of  HQDA, Stability 
Operations, FM 3-07 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2008), emphasized US national security strategy 
goals, including promoting “effective democracies.”
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“the surge” resulted in US airstrikes killing “nearly four times as many 
Iraqis in 2007 than in 2006.”28 Three years later Americans in Marjah, 
Afghanistan, spoke in violent clear-hold-build terms. After defeating a 
resurgent Taliban—“‘Mowing the grass,’ the soldiers and Marines deri-
sively call[ed] it”—American commanders would bring government and 
police forces into the cleared area. “We’ve got a government in a box, 
ready to roll in,” claimed General Stanley McChrystal, the top American 
commander at the time.29
Looking back, the logic flaws become clear; for instance, how 
could counterinsurgents provide effective population-centric security 
leading to lasting local political reform if the population and its govern-
mental leaders too often saw US soldiers as “anti-bodies” invading their 
body politic?
The tactical impracticalities of counterinsurgency paled in 
comparison to the larger faith that American forces overseas could 
change the very culture of local inhabitants and the armed forces in 
which they served. Paula Broadwell, David Petraeus’s biographer, cited 
the general’s challenge to a young American officer to help “change 
the culture of the Afghan military.”30 Though public pronouncements 
of progress met with warm reception at home, they arguably lacked 
credible evidence in theater. After Petraeus’s departure, one US Army 
colonel wrote a searing epitaph on the counterinsurgents’ ambitions: 
“Ultimately, American strategy had failed in Afghanistan (and Iraq) 
because it was founded on an illusion—that American-style counter-
insurgency could win Muslim hearts and minds at gunpoint and create 
viable nation-states on the Western model virtually from scratch in a 
short time.”31
Yet the lackluster record of American interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan did little to dissuade the disciples of war from supporting US 
ground troops in Syria, Libya, and even the Ukraine. Michael O’Hanlon, 
for example, envisioned a “force package” of 25,000 American troops 
in Syria as part of a much larger international peacekeeping force. 
“It would not be an easy mission,” O’Hanlon acknowledged, “and 
Syria is not ripe for such a peace deal or peacekeeping force now.” Still, 
deploying US soldiers would be “promising.”32 In a similar vein, Samantha 
Power, US ambassador to the United Nations, warned “against a kind 
of intervention fatigue, emphasizing that US leadership is needed now 
more than ever amid global threats from Ebola to the Islamic State.”33
28     Michael A. Cohen, “The Myth of  a Kinder, Gentler, War,” World Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring 
2010): 83, doi:10.1162/wopj.2010.27.1.75. Importantly, the new counterinsurgency doctrine did not 
eliminate the need for combat operations and noted the role violence plays in attempts to create a 
secure environment in which political progress might be made.
29     Dexter Filkins, “Afghan Offensive Is New War Model,” New York Times, February 12, 2010.
30     Paula Broadwell and Vernon Loeb, All In: The Education of  General David Petraeus (New York: 
Penguin, 2012), 195. Of  course, one could argue changing the culture of  a military organization and 
of  the local population are two separate matters, as well as American made progress in altering the 
culture of  the Afghan military to be less corrupt and less brutal, while making comparatively little 
gains in changing civilian attitudes. On this issue, see Rochelle Davis, “Culture as a Weapon,” Middle 
East Report 40, no. 255 (Summer 2010): 8–13.
31     Gian P. Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of  Counterinsurgency (New York: New 
Press, 2013), 135.
32     Michael O’Hanlon, “What 100,000 U.S. Boots on the Ground Get You in Syria,” Reuters, 
November 19, 2015.
33     Molly O’Toole, “UN Ambassador Warns against Intervention Fatigue,” Defense One, 
November 19, 2014.
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If Power advised being “careful about overdrawing lessons” 
from US interventions abroad, then what should Americans take 
from decades of war that have at best unevenly realized foreign policy 
objectives? First, we should question the notion that democratic ideals 
and liberal capitalism are universal ideologies. During the Cold War, 
as David Engerman points out, both the United States and Soviet 
Union “held that their conceptions of society applied to all nations and 
people.”34 Far from ushering in an era of peace after World War II, this 
ideological competition only furthered the global violence unleashed 
by colonialism’s demise. For Americans in particular, a longer view of 
history might have suggested that any transition to democracy was an 
inherently violent affair. Thus, perhaps it is beneficial to question our 
messianic faith that all peoples deem the US political system as the end 
state of history.
Second, Americans should realize that foreign policy rests on 
domestic consent and that dissent against military adventurism overseas 
is not an unpatriotic act. Like many fundamentalist faiths, our convic-
tion in the utility of force abroad has little room for dissenting voices. 
When it comes to any talk of our armed forces, what emanates from the 
body politic is, in Cecilia E. O’Leary’s words, a “culturally conformist, 
militaristic patriotism.”35 In the process, failure to wage war becomes 
an act of weakness rather than an act of restraint. Inaction becomes a 
failure of resolve. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy spoke 
for many Americans in 1965 when he argued the “international prestige 
of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly 
at risk in Vietnam.”36 But were they? Was the prominence of one of 
the world’s superpowers truly at stake if the Vietnamese people chose 
communism over democracy in a civil war over national identity in the 
postcolonial era?
The crucial assumption that inaction axiomatically leads to loss of 
prestige, should be examined more forcefully by both policymakers and 
the citizens electing them to office. Jeremi Suri has called Americans 
a “nation-building people,” but these people hardly question the effi-
cacy of the nation-building process or whether those receiving US aid 
actually desire to be built in an American image. Suri rightfully con-
tends “nation-building always requires partners” and relationships are 
more important than raw power.37 Yet, recent experiences indicate such 
relationships are often coercive and host-nation leaders invariably play 
the junior partners. While leaders such as South Vietnamese President 
Ngo Dinh Diem (1955–63) and Iraqi Prime Minister Nūrī al-Mālikī 
(2006–14) may have held immense leverage over their American benefac-
tors, the unequal nature of allying with the United States often spreads 
bitterness and resentment rather than a faith in democratic ways.
34     David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of  the Cold War, 1917–1962,” in The 
Cambridge History of  the Cold War, Volume I: Origins, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
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These unintended consequences lead to a final point: the employment 
of military force can actually run counter to desired policy objectives. 
Strategic miscalculations are hardly new. The Pearl Harbor and 9/11 
attacks surely wrought unforeseen aftereffects for their architects. The 
same, however, could be said of US interventions over the last 15 years. 
Americans too easily dismissed Osama bin Laden’s denunciations of US 
military presence on Islamic holy lands in the Middle East. It is unlikely 
the Bush administration anticipated a full-blown insurgency in response 
to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Thus, Americans should think more deeply 
about the repercussions of wielding their power so readily across the 
globe. As Alex Braithwaite persuasively argues, “the deployment of 
troops overseas increases the likelihood of transnational terrorist attacks 
against the global interests of the deploying state.”38 War is not without 
its consequences.
Self-Examinations
Perhaps, then, our unquestioning faith in military force is misplaced. 
Despite defeat in Vietnam, which led to a temporary dip in enthusiasm 
for war, many (if not most) Americans still believe war can deliver. 
While we may not relish war—the challenges of military recruitment 
imply a lack of zeal in being part of war—we still have faith in it. But, 
on what evidence does this faith rely? A more critical appraisal might 
result in deeper inquisitions on the utility of force in the modern era. As 
Andrew Bacevich has asked, “How is it that our widely touted post-Cold 
War military superiority has produced not enhanced security but the 
prospect of open-ended conflict?”39 If war only promotes more war, 
then why do we continue to turn to it?
In large sense, the United States’ global application of force has 
become a new manifest destiny: our efforts around the world legitimize 
the belief that our calling is from some higher being. Our faith sup-
ports not only the goals of American-led democratic liberalism, but the 
means to achieve those ends as well. Yet “manifest destiny,” a phrase 
first coined in the 1840s, has always been a myth, continuing to be, a 
conveniently persuasive cover for expanding the American empire. In 
the process, our faith in war goes largely unquestioned.
None of this is to argue, as Martin van Creveld did at the Cold 
War’s end, that “present-day military power is simply irrelevant as an 
instrument for extending or defending political interests over most of 
the globe.”40 Rather, the point is Americans need to scrutinize their 
faith in military power. Internationalism and interventionism must be 
balanced with humility and an acceptance of limits. Collective security 
must be collective; coalitions cannot be built just as window dressing. 
And, Americans must accept not every foreign policy problem has a 
military solution.
Reflecting upon and challenging faith in the utility of military 
force is not unpatriotic, and questioning war’s efficacy should not be a 
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third rail in American politics. War is unpredictable, chaotic, and more 
often than not destabilizing, even when outsiders endeavor to import 
freedom and democracy to a society. True, war helps “make the world 
understandable, a black and white tableau of them and us,” as Chris 
Hedges argues. But, Hedges is also correct in suggesting war frequently 
“suspends thought, especially self-critical thought.”41 In an era of 
persistent conflict, it seems the time has come to think more critically 
about our faith in the power of military might.
War has become a secular religion for Americans. Yet, no religion 
promotes the best in humanity when its adherents narrowly view the 
world only through the lens of their own faith. If Anderson and Cayton 
are correct in proposing “Americans have fought less to preserve liberty 
than to extend the power of the United States in the name of liberty,” then 
the time is ripe for all of us to question not only our faith in war, but why 
we turn to it all too often.42
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